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LEANDRO V. STATE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON SCHOOL
SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS IN NORTH
CAROLINA
JOSEPH W. GOODMAN*
In the last decade, school districts throughout the country have
imposed strict zero tolerance policies, which have led schools to
suspend and expel record numbers of students. Recent scholarship
has suggested that these school regulations are susceptible to state
constitutional challenges where students are not provided with
alternative educational settings. This Article evaluates the viability
of a constitutional challenge to North Carolina's regulations. It
concludes that the State's failure to provide alternative educational
settings, in all but the most extreme cases, violates the North
Carolina Constitution.
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[S]uspensions and expulsions ... alone should not be the end
goal of student discipline. Significant remediation efforts need
to take place to ensure that those students ... get the help they
need [to] return to the regular school environment and be
successful, both behaviorally and academically.'
INTRODUCTION
Following a series of school shootings in the 1990s, culminating
in the massacre at Columbine High School in 1999, and in response to
Federal legislation,2 school districts throughout the country imposed
strict zero tolerance policies.' These policies have led schools to
1. PUB. SCH. OF N.C., Div. OF ACCOUNTABILITY SERVICES, ANNUAL STUDY OF
SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS: 2000-01 8 (2002) [hereinafter 2000-2001 STUDY],
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/schoolimprovement/alternative/reports/suspensions/2
00203.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
2. Specifically, Congress enacted the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, which provided
for mandatory expulsion as follows:
[E]ach State receiving Federal funds under this chapter shall have in effect a State
law requiring local educational agencies to expel from school for a period of not
less than one year a student who is determined to have brought a weapon to a
school under the jurisdiction of local educational agencies in that State, except that
such State law shall allow the chief administering officer of such a local
educational agency to modify such expulsion requirement for a student on a case-
by-case basis.
20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1) (2000), repealed by No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-10, 115 Stat. 1425, 1986 (2002). However, the Gun-Free Schools Act stated that
"[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent a State from allowing a local
educational agency that has expelled a student from such a student's regular school setting
from providing educational services to such student in an alternative setting."
§ 8921(b)(2).
3. As the American Bar Association explained:
"Zero tolerance" is the phrase that describes America's response to student
misbehavior. Zero tolerance means that a school will automatically and severely
punish a student for a variety of infractions. While zero tolerance began as a
Congressional response to students with guns, gun cases are the smallest category
of school discipline cases. Indeed, zero tolerance covers the gamut of student
misbehavior, from including "threats" in student fiction to giving aspirin to a
classmate. Zero tolerance has become a one-size-fits-all solution to all the
problems that schools confront. It has redefined students as criminals, with
unfortunate consequences.
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suspend and expel record numbers of students. Recent scholarship
has suggested that these school regulations that punish violations with
suspensions and expulsions are susceptible to state constitutional
challenges where schools do not provide students with alternative
educational settings.4
The harsh consequences that these policies can have on a child
are demonstrated by a discussion of Tonya, a seventh grade student at
a North Carolina public middle school.5 Tonya was involved in a fight
with another student during the third week of school. As a teacher
intervened between the two students, Tonya inadvertently struck the
teacher on the arm. As a result of this incident, the school suspended
Tonya for the remainder of the year. In hopes of expediting her
return to school, Tonya waived her right to appeal the suspension
and, instead, requested placement in an alternative school. Her
request was denied. Tonya,- therefore, was to be -left without any
educational alternative for an entire school year due to her
involvement in the fight. With legal representation, however, Tonya
was able to recover her right to an appeal and the school board heard
her case. Following a hearing, the school board decided to reduce
Tonya's suspension to a semester. Nevertheless, her semester-long
suspension raises the question: does the North Carolina Constitution
allow a school to deny a child, such as Tonya, her fundamental right
to an education, for participating in a fight?
Given the fundamental nature of education, the State cannot
deprive a student of an education merely because the student was
expelled or suspended long-term. Thus, this Article evaluates the
viability of a state constitutional challenge to North Carolina's
Ralph C. Martin, II, Zero Tolerance Policy Report, 2001 ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE
COMMITTEE, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/zerotolreport.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
4. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO
TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE POLICIES 39-49, app. II at 11-3 to -5, -21 to -31
(June 2000) [hereinafter HARVARD REPORT] (outlining due process protections against
zero tolerance policies), http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/discipline/
opportsuspended.php (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Eric Blumenson &
Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and You're Out? Constitutional Constraints on Zero Tolerance in
Public Education, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 65, 87-115 (2003) (suggesting that expulsions and
suspensions unaccompanied by educational alternatives violate the Federal Constitution,
as well as state constitutions).
5. Although based on a true story, certain facts, including the student's name, have
been changed to protect the student's identity. Email from Jane Wettach, Director,
Children's Education Law Clinic at Duke Law School, to Joseph Goodman, Visiting
Scholar, Georgetown University (May 25, 2005, 11:17 am EST) (on file with North
Carolina Law Review).
1509
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
suspension and expulsion regulations. Part I of this Article details the
recent rise in suspensions and expulsions in North Carolina public
schools. Next, Part II evaluates North Carolina jurisprudence on
suspensions, expulsions, and the right to an education. Part III
provides a state constitutional analysis of suspensions and expulsions
where there is no provision for an alternative education. Part IV
examines how alternative educational settings protect students'
constitutional rights while still achieving the State's interest, and
Part V addresses policy arguments against suspension and expulsion.
This Article concludes that the State's failure to provide, in all but the
most extreme cases, alternative educational settings for students who
have been suspended or expelled violates the due process clause of
the North Carolina Constitution.
I. SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA
Every year, thousands of students are suspended and expelled
from North Carolina public schools.6 The number is on the rise,
particularly with regard to minorities.7 Suspensions and expulsions
"are increasing overall, and ... certain subgroups of students are
disproportionately represented in those events."' Between the 1999-
2000 and 2000-2001 school years, for example, North Carolina
schools experienced a twenty-two percent increase in long-term
suspensions (more than ten days) and a seventy-one percent increase
in expelled students. 9 Of all ethic-gender groups, Black/Multi-racial
males accounted for the highest percentage of long-term suspensions
and were the most over-represented group, approximately two and a
half times their representation in the general student body.10
Furthermore, "almost half of expelled students were Black/Multi-
racial males, despite the fact that they constitute only sixteen percent
6. See PUB. SCH. OF N.C., DIV. OF ACCOUNTABILITY SERVICES, ANNUAL STUDY
OF SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS: 2002-03 v (Mar. 2004) [hereinafter 2002-2003
STUDY], http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/schoolimprovement/alternative/reports/
suspensions/2002-03.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). During the 2002-
2003 school year, for example, there were 3,987 long-term suspensions (greater than ten
days) and 381 expulsions. Id.
7. See id.
8. 2000-2001 STUDY, supra note 1, at 7.
9. Id. at i-ii; see also 2002-2003 STUDY, supra note 6, at v (noting that the "number
of long-term suspensions rose for the third consecutive year in 2002-03, from 3,484 to
3,987-a 14% increase" and observing that "[plerhaps the most notable trend evident in
these data is the rise in the number of expulsions reported-from 256 in 2001-02 to 381 in
2002-03.").
10. 2000-2001 STUDY, supra note 1, at i.
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of the overall student population."'" American Indian students had
the greatest increase in rates of long-term suspensions. 2
Although most of the expelled or suspended students receive
education in alternative settings, many do not. 3 As a result, large
numbers of children in North Carolina do not receive the benefits of
public education. "Those who are suspended and expelled out of
school often go unsupervised, resulting in negative academic
consequences and all too frequently, increases in crime and
delinquency problems."' 4
II. NORTH CAROLINA JURISPRUDENCE ON SUSPENSIONS AND
EXPULSIONS
Current North Carolina jurisprudence does not require
alternative educational programs for students who are expelled or
suspended. In the 1987 In re Jackson5 decision, the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina found that the school board did not have a duty to
educate a student expelled for misconduct because "a child may lose
his right to benefit from any public school program."6 In its
evaluation of the constitutionality of school suspensions and
expulsions for misconduct, the Jackson court declined to undertake a
strict scrutiny analysis. 7 Yet ten years later, in the 1997 Leandro v.
State18 decision, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a free
public education is a fundamental right guaranteed under the North
Carolina Constitution and that attempts to limit it will be subject to
11. Id. at iii.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 7 ("During these suspensions and expulsions, about three quarters of the
students have the opportunity to attend alternative learning programs (ALPs) and about a
fourth do not."). This means that of the 2,861 students expelled or suspended long term in
2000-2001, see 2000-2001 STUDY, supra note 1, at i-ii, approximately seven hundred were
not given the opportunity to attend an alternative education program. Of the 4,368
students expelled or suspended long term in 2002-2003, more than one thousand were not
given the opportunity to attend an alternative education program. See 2002-2003 STUDY,
supra note 6, at v.
14. 2000-2001 STUDY, supra note 1, at 7. See also Roni R. Reed, Note, Education and
the State Constitutions: Alternatives for Suspended and Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 582, 605 & n.156 (1996) (stating that suspensions are "one of the major factors
explaining the decision to drop out," and citing studies that document the resulting
increased likelihood of criminal activity, unemployment and greater need for public
assistance).
15. 84 N.C. App. 167, 352 S.E.2d 449 (1987).
16. Id. at 176, 352 S.E.2d at 455.
17. Although the Jackson court did not explicitly undertake a substantive due process
analysis, it seemed to apply a rational basis test in a somewhat cursory evaluation of the
constitutionality of school suspensions and expulsions. See id. at 175-76, 352 S.E.2d at 455.
18. 346 N.C. 336,488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
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strict scrutiny.19 Following Leandro, in a substantive due process
challenge to the constitutionality of North Carolina school regulations
that punish a student by suspension or expulsion, a court should apply
the difficult-to-meet strict scrutiny standard.20
This Article evaluates the potential viability of a substantive due
process challenge to school suspensions based on the Leandro
determination that there is a fundamental right to an education. It
argues that the removal of some students from the public school
system for misconduct may violate their right to an education
guaranteed under the North Carolina Constitution. Under strict
scrutiny, expulsion or suspension from school is often not
"necessary, ' '21 nor is it "narrowly tailored,"'22 to achieve a "compelling
governmental interest. '23  In the event of a child's misconduct,
generally there are alternative educational settings that enable the
government to achieve its interest in maintaining a safe learning
environment while, at the same time, protecting the child's
fundamental right to an education.
A. In re Jackson
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has not yet specifically
evaluated the constitutionality of expulsions and suspensions for
student misbehavior under strict scrutiny. In Jackson, the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina declined to apply strict scrutiny in
evaluating the constitutionality of school expulsions and
suspensions.24 Although the court did not explicitly undertake a
substantive due process analysis, it seemingly applied a lower rational
basis standard to hold that "[r]easonable regulations punishable by
suspension do not deny the right to an education but rather deny the
right to engage in the prohibited behavior. ' 25  This lower level of
analysis "merely requires that distinctions which are drawn by a
19. See id. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261.
20. Alternatively, an equal protection analysis could identify the burdened class as
suspended or expelled students and the unaffected class as all other students. The
argument would be that the State is denying expelled students their fundamental right to
equality, because if the State provides education to some, it must provide it to all.
21. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261. (quoting Town of Beech Mountain v.
County of Watauga, 324 N.C. 409,412,378 S.E.2d 780, 782 (1989)).
22. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 377, 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (2002) (citing
Northampton County Drainage Dist. No. One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 746, 392 S.E.2d 352,
355 (1990)).
23. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357,488 S.E.2d at 261.
24. See In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 175-76, 352 S.E.2d 449, 455 (1987).
25. Id. at 176, 352 S.E.2d at 455 (emphasis added).
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challenged statute or action bear some rational relationship to a
conceivable legitimate governmental interest.
26
Citing the court of appeals' decision in Fowler v. Williams,27 the
court explained that "[t]he right to attend school and claim the
benefits of the public school system is subject to lawful rules
prescribed for the government thereof. ' 28  The court went on to
explain:
A student's right to an education may be constitutionally
denied when outweighed by the school's interest in protecting
other students, teachers, and school property, and in preventing
the disruption of the educational system. As a general rule, a
student may be constitutionally suspended or expelled for
misconduct whenever the conduct is of a type the school may
legitimately prohibit, and procedural due process is provided.29
In fact, the court went on to hold that "public schools have no
affirmative duty to provide an alternate educational program for
suspended students in the absence of a legislative mandate."3
In failing to undertake a substantive due process analysis and
applying what seems to be a standard of review lower than strict
scrutiny, the Jackson court did not evaluate whether the State had a
compelling government interest or whether expulsions or suspensions
were narrowly tailored.31 Because the North Carolina Constitution
places the duty to legislate education policy on the General
Assembly,32 the Jackson court largely relied on a separation of powers
argument to justify its objection to judicial involvement. It concluded
that "[o]ur legislature did not impose upon the public schools or other
agency a legal obligation to provide an alternative forum for
suspended students, and a court may not judicially create the
obligation.""
26. Texfi Indus. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 11, 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1980)
(citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528
(1974)).
27. 39 N.C. App. 715,251 S.E.2d 889 (1979).
28. Jackson, 84 N.C. App. at 176, 352 S.E.2d at 455 (quoting Fowler, 39 N.C. App. at
718, 251 S.E.2d. at 891).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 176, 352 S.E.2d at 455 (citing 2 JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW
§ 9.06(3)(d) (1986)).
31. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 377, 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (2002) (citing
Northampton County Drainage Dist. No. One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 746, 392 S.E.2d 352,
355 (1990)).
32. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1).
33. Jackson, 84 N.C. App. at 177, 352 S.E.2d at 456.
2005] 1513
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B. Leandro v. State
While Jackson failed to analyze the right to education under
substantive due process or equal protection, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina addressed the issue in Leandro v. State.34  In
undertaking this analysis, the supreme court had to first determine
the applicable level of scrutiny to apply to the state's education
system." Strict scrutiny, which is the Supreme Court of North
Carolina's highest tier of review, "applies only when the classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class."36  In
Leandro, the supreme court determined education to be a
fundamental right protected by strict scrutiny.37
In particular, the Leandro court considered whether the state's
system of school funding, which is based partly on local property
taxes, denies students from relatively poor school districts the
educational opportunities given to students from relatively wealthy
districts.38 The court analyzed several provisions of the North
Carolina Constitution. First, the court addressed the question of
whether the constitution guarantees children a "qualitatively
adequate education."39 The court focused this part of the inquiry on
article I, section 15 of the state constitution, which provides that
"[t]he people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the
duty of the State to guard and maintain that right."4" The court used
this language to conclude that the constitution expressly guarantees
children in North Carolina the right to a "sound basic education. ' 41
Second, the court attempted to outline the essential components
of a "sound basic education. '42 The court specifically identified basic
skills in reading, writing, science, math, history, geography, and
economic and political systems as necessary to prepare each child to
pursue further formal education, to engage in vocational training, or
to become gainfully employed.43
34. 346 N.C. 336, 357, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (1997).
35. Dep't of Transp. v. Rowe, 353 N.C. 671, 675, 549 S.E.2d 203, 207 (2001).
36. White v. Pate, 308 N.C. 759, 766, 304 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1983) (citing Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973)).
37. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261.
38. See id. at 345, 488 S.E.2d at 254.
39. Id.
40. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
41. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 254.
42. Id. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255.
43. Id.
[Vol. 831514
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The court concluded that public school students have a
fundamental right to an education and that an infringement of that
right would be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard." In
remanding the case, the supreme court explained that if the trial court
makes findings and conclusions from competent evidence to the
effect that defendants in this case are denying children of the
state a sound basic education, a denial of a fundamental right
will have been established. It will then become incumbent
upon defendants to establish that their actions denying this
fundamental right are "necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest.
45
Although the Leandro court also clearly recognized the
importance of judicial deference to the legislative and executive
branches in "the administration of the public schools, 46 the court
ultimately concluded that the judiciary has a duty to act where there
is a denial of a fundamental right:
If the defendants are unable to [establish that their actions
denying this fundamental right are "necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest"], it will then be the duty of
the court to enter a judgment granting declaratory relief and
such other relief as needed to correct the wrong while
minimizing the encroachment upon the other branches of
government.4
7
As the Supreme Court of North Carolina recently explained in
Stephenson v. Bartlett,48 "[u]nder strict scrutiny, a challenged
governmental action is unconstitutional if the State cannot establish
that it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental
interest. '49 Thus, a student in a North Carolina public school will
prevail on a substantive due process claim (and a North Carolina
court will be obligated to enjoin the school from suspending or
expelling the student without providing an adequate alternative
educational setting) if the State is unable to demonstrate: (1) a
compelling governmental interest for denying the student's
44. id. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261.
45. Id. (quoting Town of Beech Mountain v. County of Watauga, 324 N.C. 409, 412,
378 S.E.2d 780, 782 (1989)).
46. See id.
47. Id. (citing Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761,784,413 S.E.2d 276,291 (1992)).
48. 355 N.C. 354, 562 S.E.2d 377 (2002).
49. Id. at 377-78, 562 S.E.2d at 393 (citing Northampton County Drainage Dist. No.
One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 746, 392 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1990)).
2005] 1515
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fundamental right to a free public education; and (2) that the
governmental action is narrowly tailored to achieve this interest. 0
An argument can be made that, although the Leandro court held
that there is a fundamental right to education, this holding is limited
to the school financing context and should not carry over into the
area of school discipline. Some support for this argument can
conceivably be found in other state supreme court rulings that have
sought to distinguish school financing rulings from rulings in other
school contexts.51 It appears, however, that most state courts that
have held that there is a fundamental right to education have
determined that this right is fundamental in every educational
context. For example, the Supreme Court of California has ruled that
"[b]ecause the school financing system ... has been shown ... to
involve a suspect classification ... and because that classification
affects the fundamental interest of the students of this state in
education, we have no difficulty in concluding ... that the school
financing system ... must be examined under ... strict and searching
scrutiny. "52
50. Id.
51. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held in Kolesnick v. Omaha Public School
District that a student does not have a fundamental right to an education but seemed to
limit its holding to "the context of student discipline." 558 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Neb. 1997).
Nevertheless, this limitation may be somewhat vacuous because the Nebraska court does
not appear to have held education to be a fundamental right in any context. See, e.g.,
Banks v. Bd. of Educ., 277 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Neb. 1979) (discussing the Nebraska
Constitution's "free instruction" requirement as relevant to the constitutionality of
taxation schemes but not even mentioning fundamental rights analysis). Moreover, most
courts that sought to distinguish between different educational contexts held school
financing issues to a lower level of scrutiny than other education issues. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin has held that "notwithstanding our recognition that education is ... a
fundamental right, we apply... a rational basis standard because the rights at issue ... are
premised upon spending disparities and not upon a complete denial of educational
opportunity." Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 580 (Wis. 1989). The Supreme Court of
Minnesota has similarly held that rational basis review applies in determining whether
school financing is thorough and efficient, although strict scrutiny applies to determine if
the state legislature has met a student's fundamental right to "a general and uniform
system of public schools." See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315-16 (Minn. 1993) (en
banc). The Supreme Court of Arizona has also held that there is a fundamental right to a
"basic education," although it has applied rational basis in the school-financing context.
Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973) (en banc). However, the Supreme
Court of Arizona noted: "[w]e do not understand how the rational basis test can be used
when a fundamental right has been implicated. They seem to us to be mutually exclusive.
If education is a fundamental right, the compelling state interest (strict scrutiny) ought to
apply." Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811 (Ariz. 1994) (en
banc).
52. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania also "consistently examined problems related to schools in the context of
that fundamental right." Sch. Dist. of Wilkinsburg. v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass'n, 667 A.2d
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SUSPENSIONS AND
EXPULSIONS WITHOUT PROVISION OF ALTERNATIVE
EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS
A. State's Compelling Interest in Suspensions and Expulsions
Suppose a school expels a student without providing an
alternative educational setting and that student challenges the action
in court in light of Leandro's characterization of education as a
fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny. The State of North
Carolina will likely demonstrate a compelling interest in removing
some students from the classroom for certain types of misbehavior,
thereby satisfying the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis. 3 The
State should be able to establish that the maintenance of safe public
schools and the protection of the learning environment are
compelling governmental interests that are sufficient to justify
removal of certain problem students. For example, other authors
have argued that the State will "almost certainly" be able to satisfy
this first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis for students expelled or
suspended for drug possession:
The [S]tate's interest surely includes protecting the learning
environment; in particular, removal of students who bring drugs
to school may be necessary to keep schools from becoming drug
markets and classmates from losing learning abilities from the
effects of drugs. The continued presence of illicit drugs in
schools may also encourage classroom disruptions or violence
among students or portray school administrators and rules as
toothless. The [S]tate surely has a compelling interest in using
disciplinary sanctions to deter offenses and minimize these
risks, which threaten to deprive schoolchildren of their
education.54
5, 9 (Pa. 1995). The Supreme Court of Connecticut has similarly held that "the right to
education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly
scrutinized." Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977) (emphasis added). These
rulings are in line with the more logical reasoning that holds that a right is fundamental
regardless of the context with which it is evaluated.
53. For example, removing students from school for drug possession, gun possession,
or violence is more likely to satisfy the State's compelling interest than removal for
general disobedience, such as missed assignments, excessive talking, or tardiness.
54. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 4, at 108.
1517
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B. Not Narrowly Tailored When No Alternative Educational Settings
Are Provided
On the other hand, the State will have difficulty satisfying the
second prong. Except in the most extreme cases, it will be difficult to
demonstrate that the removal of students from public schools without
providing them with an alternative educational setting is narrowly
tailored to achieve the State's interest." In evaluating whether the
state action is narrowly tailored, North Carolina courts will assess the
availability of alternative courses of action that would infringe less on
a fundamental right. 6 In certain cases, including for example, a
student threatening a teacher or another student with a gun or knife,
an alternative course of action may not be available. The danger that
the student may act out violently to others may make suspension or
expulsion the only option.
Nevertheless, because suspensions and expulsions amount to a
complete denial of an education, these sanctions are often not
narrowly tailored because the child is deprived of a "sound basic
education"57 that is "the minimum constitutionally permissible."58 As
discussed in the next Part, alternative educational settings would
protect the child's fundamental right to an education while, at the
same time, satisfying the State's interest in maintaining safe public
schools.
IV. ALTERNATIVE EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS
Consistent with the jurisprudence discussed in Jackson, school
regulations in North Carolina do not require school districts to
provide alternative educational settings for students who have been
suspended or expelled.59 The placement of suspended and expelled
students into Alternative Learning Programs (ALPs) is done on a
"case-by-case basis, based on processes and procedures developed by
each of the 117 Local Education Agencies (LEAs) and the nearly 100
55. See supra text accompanying note 53.
56. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 377-78, 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (2002)
(citing Northampton County Drainage Dist. No. One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 746, 392
S.E.2d 352, 355 (1990)).
57. See Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 354, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (1997).
58. See id.
59. Section 115C-47 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, for example, requires
local education boards to "establish at least one alternative learning program" and then
requires that the boards "adopt guidelines for assigning students to [these] programs."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-47(32a) (2003). These assignment guidelines must include
"strategies for providing alternative learning programs, when feasible and appropriate, for
students who are subject to long-term suspension or expulsion." Id. (emphasis added).
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charter schools."' Under state law, each LEA was to have an ALP in
place by the middle of 2000 or have received a waiver from the State
Board of Education.6' By the end of 2001, each LEA had an ALP in
place or had requested a waiver. 62 However, not every ALP serves
expelled or suspended students.63 Moreover, even when an ALP
accepts expelled and suspended students, it may not accept every
expelled or suspended student. Indeed, not all ages and grades are
served by every ALP, the ALP may be at its enrollment capacity, or
the ALP staff may not have the ability to handle the student and meet
his or her needs.'
North Carolina, however, could provide ALPs for nearly all
expelled and suspended students. Twenty-six states require school
districts to provide alternative educational settings for expelled or
suspended students.6' These states maintain a safe educational
environment while, at the same time, providing an education to
expelled students in various alternative settings. 66  Every state,
including North Carolina, already accomplished both of these goals
for all expelled students with disabilities, as the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) requires.67 As other authors
have pointed out, "even juvenile institutions housing the most
dangerous delinquents are able to provide them with educational
services."' Given these successes, North Carolina will have difficulty
demonstrating that suspensions or expulsions without an alternative
educational setting are the most precise means available to
accommodate the misbehaving students.
Jonathan Wren described the characteristics of alternative
educational programs that accommodate some of the more difficult
students. He explains:
Probably the most distinguishable characteristic of these
alternative schools is that they combine the personalized
curriculum and smaller class size of traditional alternative
60. 2001-2002 STUDY, supra note 1, at 4.
61. 2002-2003 STUDY, supra note 6, at 4-5.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 51 (citing N.C. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, ALTERNATIVE LEARNING
PROGRAMS EVALUATION: 1999-00 (2001)).
64. Id. at 5.
65. See HARVARD REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
66. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 4, at 109.
67. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
(2000) (forbidding states from terminating educational services through expulsion or
suspension greater than ten days for disabled children, even without a connection between
their misbehavior and their handicapping condition).
68. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 4, at 109.
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school models with the stringent restrictions and social controls
of correctional institutions. Often, students are granted more
freedom in designing their course load and the programs
usually have self-paced schedules, no grades, and no
homework.69
However, the alternative educational programs subject students
to strict regimens. Students have early morning check-ins, random
drug tests, and police monitored movement throughout school.' In
addition to their regular coursework, students attend a variety of
classes on subjects such as behavior modification, conflict
management, and self-control.7 Also, the programs often offer
services to families to facilitate the process.
7 2
As evidenced by the examples in this Article, there are a
variety of alternative education programs that allow most, if not all,
disruptive students to continue their education while still achieving
the State's interest in maintaining safe schools. For example, Texas
has established "a comprehensive system intended to achieve 'zero
tolerance' for disruptive children in the classroom and continue the
education of virtually all children who are removed from class or
expelled from school. '73  Although it may be contended that such
alternative educational programs are expensive and ineffective, a
study of the Texas system from 1996 to 1997 determined that the
programs can be effective.74  Indeed, the Texas system has been
successful in establishing a safety net for suspended and expelled
students so that they can stay within the education system and
continue to receive public education.75
There are also individual programs that have succeeded in
reducing violence. For example, the Maya Angelou Public Charter
School (MAPCS), located in northwest Washington, D.C., was
established to educate students who have a tendency for violent
behavior. In fact, prior to their enrollment, many MAPCS students
69. Jonathan Wren, Alternative Schools for Disruptive Youths: A Cure for What Ails
School Districts Plagued by Violence?, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 307, 345 (1995) (footnotes
omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Steve Bickerstaff et al., Preserving the Opportunity for Education: Texas'
Alternative Education Programs for Disruptive Youth, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 2 (Oct. 1997)
(emphasis added).
74. Id. at 39 (noting that programs succeeded when there was "cooperation of local
school, juvenile board and county officials").
75. Id.
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had been arrested and regularly resorted to violence in an attempt to
deal with their problems. However, "[d]espite its urban location and
population of 'at-risk' students, MAPCS has created an environment
where there is very little violence."76
Since states such as Texas provide virtually all expelled and
suspended students with alternative educational settings, and there
are programs like MAPCS that are able to provide a safe learning
environment for even violent students, it will be difficult for North
Carolina to establish that there are not more narrowly tailored means
to deal with most disruptive students.
Nevertheless, a requirement that the State provide all expelled
students with an alternative educational setting may impair the ability
of school officials to deter dangerous behavior. The suspension or
expulsion of the most disruptive students may, in fact, be a narrowly
tailored response. Accordingly, North Carolina may be able to
continue to expel or suspend students without providing alternative
educational settings under extreme circumstances. As the Supreme
Court of West Virginia explained:
[I]n extreme circumstances and under a strong showing of
necessity in a particular case, strict scrutiny and narrow
tailoring could permit the effective temporary denial of all
State-funded educational opportunities and services to a child
removed from regular school.., particularly when the safety of
others is threatened by the dangerous actions of a child, and
where the child is unwilling or unable to utilize educational
opportunities and services that are consistent with protecting
the safety of others.77
In allowing the State to meet its constitutional burden on a case-by-
case basis, the Supreme Court of West Virginia modified its earlier
decision in Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier County Board of
Education78 to the extent that it had previously held that the West
Virginia Constitution always required an alternative education
program when a student was expelled for a year for the sole violation
of possessing a deadly weapon.7 9
Under this reasoning, school suspensions or expulsions should
be upheld as constitutional to the extent that they protect teachers,
76. Joseph Lintott, Teaching and Learning in the Face of School Violence, 11 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 553, 573-74 (2004).
77. Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340, 350-51 (W. Va.
1997).
78. 484 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 1996).
79. Id. at 914.
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school personnel, and students from the most egregious disciplinary
violations. 80  "[C]ommon sense suggest[s] that in all but the most
extreme cases the State will be able to provide reasonable state-
funded educational opportunities and services to children who have
been removed from the classroom .... "81 Although the creation of
alternative schools will cost a significant amount of money, "standing
alone, the lack of financial resources does not present a compelling
State interest to justify the denial of [a student's] constitutional right
to an education. '82
As applied to many disruptive students, expulsions and
suspensions are likely to fail a strict scrutiny analysis because they are
not narrowly tailored. In all but the most extreme cases, therefore, a
substantive due process challenge to the constitutionality of the
student's removal will prevail until the State provides sound
alternative educational programs.
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS
Both the Jackson and Leandro courts recognized that the
administration of the school system should be left to the legislature.83
North Carolina courts will remain hesitant to make rulings that bring
about significant change to the state's education policies. Therefore,
the legislature remains an important alternative venue for change.
Indeed, several policy arguments could be put before the legislature
arguing against school expulsions and suspensions.
First, school expulsions and suspensions have not proven to be
effective at increasing safety and order in our schools. The National
Center for Education Statistics found that "between 1993 and 1999,
the percentage of students in grades 9 through 12 who were
80. See id. at 916 n.12 (recognizing that factors such as the seriousness of the offense
could preclude a student from even an alternative education program). Such a discipline
scheme would seemingly allow a school to suspend a student for a shorter period (e.g.,
four weeks) for a less serious violation as long as it was narrowly tailored. Indeed, in
coming to its decision, the Leon court took into account the length of the suspension, as
well as its likely effect on the student, and that "the prohibited conduct is defined in
essentially per se terms." Id.
81. Cathe A., 490 S.E.2d at 351.
82. Leon, 484 S.E.2d at 915.
83. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 357, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (1997) ("[T]he
administration of the public schools of the state is best left to the legislative and executive
branches of government."); In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 178, 352 S.E.2d 449, 456
(1987) ("[A] juvenile court judge does not have the power to legislate or to force school
boards to do what he thinks they should do. Our legislature did not impose upon the
public schools or other agency a legal obligation to provide an alternative forum for
suspended students, and a court may not judicially create the obligation.").
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threatened or injured with a weapon on school property in the past 12
months remained constant at about 7 to 8 percent."' A recent study
by the Harvard University Advancement Project and Civil Rights
Project concluded that "[t]here is little evidence that Zero Tolerance
Policies are working to reduce violence or increase safety in our
schools."85 Two professors who have written widely on the subject
similarly have concluded that "[d]isorder and violence in America's
schools do not appear to have been appreciably diminished, despite 4
years of national policy explicitly encouraging tougher responses."86
Second, the rationale behind the juvenile criminal system is not
to punish juvenile offenders but to rehabilitate and treat them. As
Professor Smithburn explains, "the goals and ideals underlying the
juvenile justice system focus on rehabilitation and treatment. 8 7
Juveniles are also widely regarded as being less capable of controlling
their actions and less morally culpable than adults. School
regulations that punish students by expulsion or suspension, however,
tend to employ "a brutally strict disciplinary model that embraces
harsh punishment over education."88  Therefore, the current
philosophy behind school disciplinary regulations is contrary to the
rationale behind the juvenile criminal system. North Carolina's
current regulations should be replaced with regulations that are more
in line with the rehabilitative ideal, where the goal is to reform, rather
than discipline, disruptive students.
Finally, expulsions can lead to increased crime and illiteracy. As
other authors point out:
Suspended or expelled students do not simply disappear, of
course. They embark on an inauspicious trajectory that is more
likely to endanger themselves and others when compared with
students who continue to attend their schools. This trajectory
begins by dissolving the bonds with the teachers and counselors
who would be most able to provide help to troubled students.
It leads to greatly increased chances of permanently dropping
out of school and of joblessness. There is another correlation
between the lack of secondary education and criminal behavior,
a connection aggravated by expulsions that produce
84. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND
SAFETY (2001), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/crime2001 (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
85. HARVARD REPORT, supra note 4, at 17.
86. Russell J. Skiba & Reece L. Peterson, School Discipline at the Crossroads: From
Zero Tolerance to Early Response, 66 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 335, 340 (2000).
87. J. ERIC SMITHBURN, CASES AND MATERIALS IN JUVENILE LAW 21 (2002).
88. HARVARD REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
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unsupervised free time for many who can least handle it, bleak
future prospects, and feelings of unjust treatment.89
The study by the Harvard University Advancement Project and
Civil Rights Project also concluded that "children shut out from the
education system are more likely to engage in conduct detrimental to
the safety of their family and communities. The ultimate result is that
Zero Tolerance Policies create a downward-spiral in the lives of these
children, which ultimately may lead to long-term incarceration. '
Other authors similarly concluded that when school systems lack
alternative education programs, "school personnel may simply be
dumping problem students out on the streets, only to find them later
causing increased violence and disruption in the community .... [W]e
face serious questions about the long-term negative effects of ...
school exclusion." 91  Even the Jackson court understood that
"suspended students should not be left without supervision"' and
recognized that there was a strong need for "reasonable alternatives
for effective placement" of suspended students.93 The legislature
should consider these policy arguments when reviewing its zero
tolerance regulations.
CONCLUSION
A substantive due process claim that triggers strict scrutiny
poses a strong challenge to North Carolina school regulations where
violations are punishable by expulsions and suspensions without
adequate alternative educational settings. Although the State will
likely demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in its policy, it
will have difficulty establishing that suspensions and expulsions are
narrowly tailored when the State denied approximately one thousand
children the opportunity to attend an alternative education program
during 2002-2003. 94 Since there is evidence that at least one state,
Texas, can effectively educate "virtually all children who are removed
89. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 4, at 82-83 (footnotes omitted).
90. HARVARD REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
91. Russ Skiba & Reese Peterson, The Dark Side of Zero Tolerance: Can Punishment
Lead to Safe Schools?, 80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 372, 376 (1999).
92. In re Jackson., 84 N.C. App. 167, 176, 352 S.E.2d 449, 455 (1987).
93. Id. at 176-77, 352 S.E.2d at 455. The court commented that "[h]owever
regrettable the existence of this void, a court may not overcome it by fiat." Id. at 177, 352
S.E.2d at 455. However, this preceded the Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision in
Leandro, holding that the right to an education is a fundamental right.
94. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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from class or expelled from school," 95 North Carolina will have
difficulty satisfying the second prong of the strict scrutiny test.
Moreover, there are several policy arguments that can be put
forth against school expulsions and suspensions without adequate
alternative educational settings, including that they have not proven
to be effective in increasing school safety, are contrary to the
rationale of the juvenile justice system and may ultimately prove
harmful to society. By not providing alternative educational
programs to expelled and suspended students in all but the most
extreme cases, North Carolina fails to satisfy the fundamental right to
an education, thereby violating the state constitution and hindering
the educational progress of the state.
95. Bickerstaff, supra note 73, at 2. Texas's mandated alternative education programs
and funding only applied to counties with over 125,000 in population. Id. at 3 n.4.
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